This article looks at the Gaza Marine gas field, a modest 1.1–1.4 trillion cubic feet reserve off Gaza’s coast, often dismissed as too small to fuel conflict between Israel and Palestinians. Yet, its shallow depth, ease of exploitation, and potential to yield $2.4 billion for Gaza’s economy make it a strategic prize, as evidenced by Israel and Egypt’s 2023 development plans sidelining Gazans. Comparing Gaza Marine to other fields and highlighting the scarcity of new, accessible discoveries, this analysis argues that its local significance and geopolitical exclusion drive tensions, challenging claims that its size diminishes its role in the Israel-Palestine conflict.
Gaza Marine: A Small Gas Field with Outsized Conflict Potential
The Gaza Marine gas field, located 30–36 kilometers off the Gaza Strip at a depth of 603 meters, holds estimated reserves of 1.1 to 1.4 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas, equivalent to 31.1 to 39.6 billion cubic meters (BCM) [1][2]. Discovered in 2000 by British Gas, it remains undeveloped due to Israeli restrictions, tensions between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA), and legal disputes over maritime rights [3]. Some argue that its modest size—only about 2% of Israel’s Leviathan field (22 Tcf)—makes it too insignificant to drive political tension or conflict, suggesting Israel’s actions in Gaza, particularly the 2023–2024 war following Hamas’s October 7 attack, are driven by security concerns rather than resource interests. This view, however, overlooks Gaza Marine’s strategic value, as evidenced by Israel and Egypt’s efforts to develop it without Gazan control, its relative ease of exploitation compared to other fields, the scarcity of new, easily accessible gas discoveries, and its potential to transform Gaza’s economy.
Gaza Marine’s reserves, while small globally, could supply Palestinian energy needs for approximately 15 years and generate export revenues of $700–800 million annually, totaling around $2.4 billion in royalties, according to UNCTAD estimates [1]. This economic potential makes it a lifeline for Gaza, where less than 40% of energy demands are currently met [2]. Its shallow depth of 603 meters, compared to deeper regional fields like Leviathan (1,500 m) or Karish (1,750 m), reduces development costs, making it technically easier to exploit [3]. In June 2023, Israel granted preliminary approval for Gaza Marine’s development, led by Egypt’s EGAS (45% stake) alongside the PA’s Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) and Consolidated Contractors Company (27.5% each), but required Israeli security oversight, effectively excluding Hamas-controlled Gazans [5]. Additionally, Israel’s October 2023 issuance of exploration licenses for Zone G, 62% of which lies in Palestinian waters, to companies like BP and ENI, has been labeled “pillage” by Palestinian rights groups like Adalah, violating international law under the Hague Regulations [6]. These moves suggest strategic control, not indifference, countering the claim that Gaza Marine’s size negates tension. Social media posts on X amplify Palestinian sentiment that Israel seeks to “steal” the gas, though such claims lack direct evidence given Israel’s larger fields like Tamar (7.1 Tcf) and Leviathan [3].
The counterargument gains further weight when considering the scarcity of new, large, easily exploitable gas fields. Large fields, typically exceeding 3 Tcf, are rare, and “easy” exploitation requires shallow depths (under 1,000 m), conventional reservoirs, and minimal geopolitical barriers [10]. Recent discoveries like Saudi Arabia’s Jafurah (200 Tcf, unconventional, requiring fracking) and Vietnam’s Ca Voi Xanh (5.3 Tcf, 100–300 m depth, conventional) are notable, but globally, only about 5–10 new large fields meet the “easy” criteria, per industry reports [7][8][10]. Jafurah’s shale complexity raises costs, while Ca Voi Xanh benefits from Vietnam’s stability, unlike Gaza Marine’s political quagmire [7][8]. Most new discoveries are smaller or unconventional, like shale or tight gas, which demand costly technologies [4][10]. Gaza Marine’s conventional nature and shallow depth align it with fields like Thailand’s Bongkot (1.0 Tcf, 80–100 m depth), operational since 1993, showing what Gaza could achieve absent conflict [3].
Many currently exploited gas fields are either old (operational for over 20 years) or difficult to exploit (deep, offshore, or unconventional). Fields like Groningen in the Netherlands (95–99 Tcf, discovered 1959, operational since 1963, 60% depleted, 2,500–3,000 m depth) and Algeria’s Hassi R’Mel (89 Tcf, discovered 1956, operational since 1961, ~2,000 m, significantly depleted) face aging infrastructure and declining output [4]. Difficult fields include the U.S.’s Marcellus Shale (500 Tcf potential, operational since ~2008, requiring fracking) and Norway’s Troll (45.9 Tcf, discovered 1979, operational since 1996, 1,500 m under the North Sea, needing complex platforms) [4][9]. Industry estimates suggest 60–70% of global exploited fields fall into these categories, with shale dominating U.S. production (50% of total) and many Middle Eastern and North Sea fields aging [4][10]. Gaza Marine’s shallow depth makes it “easy” by comparison, enhancing its appeal despite its size [3].
To contextualize Gaza Marine’s reserves, consider comparable or smaller fields in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. The Border Field, straddling Palestinian and Israeli waters (0.1 Tcf, 3 BCM, discovered 2002), is tiny—about 10% of Gaza Marine’s size—and undeveloped due to maritime disputes, underscoring Gaza Marine’s relative importance [1]. Israel’s Noa field (0.7 Tcf, 19.8 BCM, discovered 1999, operational since 2012, ~500 m depth) is smaller, supplying domestic needs with ease due to Israel’s stability [3]. The UK’s Dolphin field (0.8 Tcf, 22.7 BCM, discovered 1990, operational since 2007, ~1,500 m depth) is also smaller but nearing depletion, its deeper location raising costs compared to Gaza Marine [3]. Thailand’s Bongkot (1.0 Tcf, 28.3 BCM, operational since 1993, 80–100 m depth) is nearly identical in size and easily exploited, highlighting Gaza Marine’s potential if developed [3]. Slightly larger fields include Israel’s Karish (1.8 Tcf, 51 BCM, discovered 2012, operational since 2022, 1,755 m depth) and Cyprus’s Aphrodite (4.1 Tcf, 116 BCM, discovered 2011, ~1,700 m, delayed by Turkey-Cyprus disputes), both costlier due to depth [3]. Larger fields, Israel’s Tamar (7.1 Tcf), Leviathan (22 Tcf), Egypt’s Zohr (26–30 Tcf), and Iran/Qatar’s South Pars/North Dome (1,800 Tcf), dwarf Gaza Marine, emphasizing its modest global role but not its local stakes [1][2][3].
Data gaps exist, particularly on new field counts, and claims of war solely over Gaza Marine lack primary evidence, but Gaza Marine’s ease of access, the rarity of similar new fields, and its value to Gazans make it a flashpoint for conflict, contradicting the counterargument that its size diminishes its significance.
NOTES
[1] "The Economic Costs of the Israeli Occupation for the Palestinian People: The Unrealized Oil and Natural Gas Potential." United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2019. https://unctad.org/publication/economic-costs-israeli-occupation-palestinian-people-unrealized-oil-and-natural-gas; Mohamed Abu Shahma, “Gaza’s Gas, What Trump May Want Even More Than Those Beach Resorts,” Worldcrunch, 20 Feb 2025, https://worldcrunch.com/focus/israel-palestine-war/gaza-gas-oil-trump/
[2] “Gaza Strip: Economy,” Encyclopedia Brittanicahttps://www.britannica.com/place/Gaza-Strip/Economy
[3] Offshore Technology. “Gaza Marine Gas Field.” https://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/gaza-marine-gas-field/
[4] U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA). (2024). International Energy Outlook 2023. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/
[5] “Israel Approves Gaza Marine Gas Development," Al Jazeera, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/18/israel-gives-preliminary-nod-to-gaza-marine-gas-development
[6] “Legal Objections to Israel’s Gas Licenses in Palestinian Waters.” Adalah. 2023.https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/10745
[7] “Ca Voi Xanh Gas Field.” Offshore Technology. https://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/ca-voi-xanh-gas-field/
[8] “Jafurah Unconventional Gas Field.” Saudi Aramco. (2023). https://www.aramco.com/en/creating-value/mega-projects/jafurah
[9] "Troll," Norweigan Petroleum, https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/facts/field/troll/
[10] “Global Gas Discoveries Decline,” AAPG Explorer, 2019. https://explorer.aapg.org/story/articleid/53534/gas-discoveries-decline
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